Joint Bidding in Federal Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions by Ken Hendricks et al.
Joint Bidding in Federal O®shore Oil and Gas Lease
Auctions
Ken Hendricks, Rob Porter, and Guofu Tan
January 31, 2000
Abstract
This paper provides an explanation for why cartels are not observed fre-
quently in mineral-rights auctions even though it was not illegal for them to
form. We use the techniques of mechanism design to characterize the e±cient,
incentive compatible cartel and show that it can be implemented by a ¯rst-
priceknockout tournament with information sharing. Weshow, however, that
bidders with the highest signals typically prefer to bid alone rather than join
the cartel. We examine bid data from federal o®shore oil and gas auctions
for evidence that cartels used bid coordination schemes. We also examine the
determinants of joint bidding.
1 Introduction
Collusion is frequently observed in auctions where bidders' willingness to pay are
independently distributed (IPV). Examples include highway construction contracts
(Porter and Zona, 1993), school milk delivery (Pesendorfer, 1998, Porter and Zona,
1999), and timber auctions (Baldwin et al., 1997). In each of these examples, the
heterogeneity in bidder valuations is due primarily to di®erences in costs, which are
arguably idiosyncratic to each bidder. The cartel's problem is to devise a mechanism
to divide the spoils and select who is going to receive the contract. In doing so,
the cartel has to overcome an adverse selection problem: none of its members know
how much each of their fellow cartel members is willing to pay for the item being
auctioned and each member wants to exploit this private information to argue for
a bigger share of the spoils. Graham and Marshall (1987), Mailath and Zemesky
(1991), and McAfee and McMillan (1992) have shown that, if an all-inclusive cartel is
allowed to use side payments, it can design implementable mechanisms that induces
each member to tell the truth and awards the item to the member who has the
1highest valuation. Furthermore, each cartel member's expected payment conditional
on her type exceeds her payo® from noncooperative bidding. Consequently, even
after all members realize their types, each prefers the cartel mechanism to bidding
noncooperatively in the seller's auction.
This paper studies cartel formation in oil and gas lease auctions where bidders
have private signals about an unknown common value. Cramton and Palfrey (1990)
and McAfee and McMillan (1992) have observed that, if all members have the same
ex post value, then the cartel does not have to worry about who should be awarded
the lease and a joint bidding agreement in which all members share equally in the
spoils is incentive compatible. Cartel members will have no incentive to misrepresent
their information since they share a common goal, which is to bid only when the
expected value of the item conditional on the pooled information exceeds the reserve
price. The problem with such agreements, however, is that the expected payment to
cartel members may not exceed the amounts they can expect to earn (conditional on
their information) by bidding alone in the seller's auction. The intuition is simple.
A bidder who has obtained a very high signal from a distribution where poor signals
are more likely to be drawn may rationally believe it can win the lease by bidding
not much above the reserve price. It pays a somewhat higher price to the seller, but
it does not have to share the surplus with any other ¯rms.
This intuition may explain the surprisingly low incidence of joint bidding among
¯rms withthe highest participationrates inthe auctions of federal o®shore oil and gas
leases is quite low. Table 1 describes the incidence of solo and joint bidding by seven
of the most active bidders: Exxon, Gulf, Mobil, Shell, Standard Oil of California,
Standard Oil of Indiana, and Texaco, hereafter called the Big 7. The sample consists
of 2227 wildcat tracts o® the coasts of Texas and Louisiana that receivedbids between
1954 and 1975.1 The table reveals that solo bidding was the dominant form of bidding
for most of the Big 7 ¯rms. Joint bids involving pairs of Big 7 ¯rms represented less
than 15% of all bids submitted by these ¯rms. Shell and Exxon rarely bid jointly.
Furthermore, if ¯rms bid jointly, they did so almost always in pairs.
Solo bidding does not imply the absence of a cartel. In testimony before Congress,
the head of Department of Interior, Darius Gaskins argued that the collusive e®ects
of joint ventures should not be measured solely in terms of tracts receiving joint
bids. The negotiations to bid jointly could allow partners to coordinate their solo
bids. The cartel could, for example, hold a ¯rst-price knockout tournament on each
tract in a speci¯c area to determine which partners valued which tracts more highly
than others and allocate the tracts accordingly. If this allocation does not achieve an
equitable balance among its members, the ¯rm with more wins could agree to bear
1In 1975, Congress passed the Energy Policy and Conservation Act that prohibited these seven
¯rms from bidding with each other for OCS leases.
2a larger share of the costs of drilling the area or, if oil is discovered and the area
unitized, a small share of production. Mechanisms involving side payments could
give high types a stronger incentive to participate. Certainly, the potential gains
from forming a cartel appear substantial. The stakes are large. The announced
reserve price is approximately $100,000 whereas the average winning bid in wildcat
auctions for the period 1954-79 was 12.8 million dollars (in 1982 dollars). The cost
of drilling an exploratory well was approximately 1.5 million dollars and the risk of
loss is signi¯cant, as only 39% of the tracts receiving bids in the period 1954-79 were
productive (Porter (1995)). By pooling geological data and expertise in interpreting
the data, ¯rms could reduce the risk of buying dry leases and, by pooling ¯nancial
resources, they can bid for more leases and diversify away more of the tract-speci¯c
uncertainties.
We investigate the cartel mechanism design problem in a simple environment in
which each bidder receives an independently and identically distributed signal, and
the value of the lease beingauctioned depends onher own signal and symmetrically on
the signals of the other bidders. Each bidder may weight her own signal more heavily
than the signals ofothers. This bidding environment has been usedby Bulow, Huang,
and Klemperer (1999) to study \common value" takeovers, by Klemperer (1998)
to study the e®ect of small asymmetries on equilibria in ascending price auctions
of common value objects, and by Krishna and Morgan (1997) to study the anti-
competitive e®ects of joint bidding and bidder restrictions in common value, second-
price auctions. We derive necessary and su±cient conditions under which ane±cient,
incentive compatible cartel exists. As in the IPV case, it can be implemented by a
¯rst-price knockout tournament in which the high bidder wins the right to bid the
reserve price in the seller's auction and the other members divide the high bid equally
among themselves.
To determine whether the cartel is enforceable, we compare the optimal cartel
payo®s to the equilibrium payo®s from bidding competitively in a ¯rst-price, sealed
bid auction. In contrast to the IPV case, we ¯nd that ¯rms with high signals may
prefer the competitive mechanism. The reason is closely related to the phenomenon
known as the "winner's curse". A ¯rm does not bid in the auction if the value of
the lease conditional on its signal being the highest is less than the reserve price.
However, it may bid in the cartel's knockout tournament because, even if it has the
highest signal, there is a chance that the expected value of the lease after all of the
signals are revealed exceeds the reserve price. Since more types bid in the cartel,
bidding in the cartel can be more aggressive than in the auction and the expected
payment (including the reserve price) higher than in the auction.2 We show that the
2This situation cannot occur in the IPV environment because the participation rule for the
auction and the knockout tournament are the same. In both cases, ¯rms bid if and only if their
3conditions under which the cartel is not enforceable are likely to be satis¯ed by oil
and gas auctions. We also show that, when it is enforceable, joint bidding typically
dominates other sharing mechanisms, at least for the limiting case of pure common
values (i.e., all signals receive the same weight).
Our empirical study of cartel formation and behavior employs data from Hen-
dricks, Pinkse, and Porter's (1999) study of bidding on federal oil and gas wildcat
lease auctions o® the coasts of Texas and Louisania. The novel feature of that data
set was the construction of a measure of the number of potential bidders on a tract.
based upon who bid in the area and when. Previous empirical studies of joint bid-
ding by Mead (1968), Erickson and Spann (1974), Gaskins and Vann (1976), Mead
and Sorenson (1980), Rockwood (1983) and Gilley et al (1985) have documented a
positive correlation between the incidence of joint bidding and the value of tracts.
These authors typically use the government's estimate of the value of the tract, the
winning bid, and/or the number of bids as a measure of ex ante value of the tract.
We establish a similar result but use the number of potential bidders and the ex post
value of the tracts as proxies for ex ante value. Much of this correlation probably
re°ects the incentive for ¯rms to ¯nd ¯nancial partners on tracts where the high bid
is likely to quite large. However, it may also re°ect the fact that potential bidders
are more likely to know who are their competitors (i.e., who intends to bid) on high
value tracts.
We examine the latter issue by restricting the sample of auctions to auctions in
which the number of potential bidders is fewer than four. These are the set of tracts
that are most likely to meet the conditions of the theory. In particular, the number
of bidders is small enough that an all-inclusive cartel is feasible, and the bidders are
not capital constrained since the tracts are marginal and bids are low. We consider
two questions. First, is there any evidence of potential bidders using bid coordination
schemes, especially bidders who bidjointly in thesale? Second, is competitive bidding
more likely to occur on tracts where ex post values are higher, as predicted by the
theory?
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we characterize optimal
cartel mechanisms and discuss implementation. In section 3we show that the optimal
cartel may not beenforceable anddescribethe class of distributions for which this will
be the case. Insection 4 we analyze the special case of pure commonvalue. In Section
5 we develop an empirical strategy for identifying cartels andthe determinants of joint
bidding. The data is presented in Section 5. The econometric results are reported in
Section 6. Section 7 provides concluding remarks.
value exceeds the reserve price.
42 Optimal Cartel Mechanisms
The seller sells one lease via a ¯rst-price sealed bid auction with a pre-announced
reserve price of R. Our primary interest is in the question of whether bidders have
incentives toform all-inclusivecartels. Given this focus, andwithout loss ofgenerality,
we simplify the model by assuming that there are only two bidders. Bidders 1 and 2
receive private signals s1 and s2 respectively; they are independently and identically
distributed on [0;1] according to the cumulative distribution function F with the
associated density f. Let u(s1;s2) represent the expected value of the lease to bidder
1 given signals s1 and s2. Symmetrically, we assume that bidder 2 values the lease
at u(s2;s1). We assume that u is increasing in both signals and that,
s2 > s1 =) u(s2;s1) > u(s1;s2): (1)
This condition states that the bidder with higher signal values the lease more than
the bidder with lower signal. Later we will study the case of pure common values,
that is, when u(s2;s1) = u(s1;s2) for all s1;s2 2 [0;1]. The valuation function and
distribution functions are common knowledge.
The cartel's objective in designing a mechanism is to maximize the ex ante sum of
bidders' pro¯ts in the auction. It faces three problems: dividing the collusive surplus,
selecting a sole bidder, and sharing information to ensure that the sole bidder pays
R to the seller only when it is pro¯table to do so.
Instead of analyzing the particular mechanisms used by cartels in oil and gas
lease auctions, we ¯rst study collusive direct revelation mechanisms in which the
sole bidder and side-payments are determined as functions of the bidders' reported
signals, which we denote as t1 and t2. A collusive direct revelation mechanism is a
pair fP;Tg where P : [0;1]2 ! [0;1]
2 and T : [0;1]2 ! R2. Here, given reports
(t1;t2), the probability that bidder 1 obtains the right to bid in the seller's auction is
P1(t1;t2) and its expected side-payment is T1(t1;t2). Clearly,
P1(t1;t2) +P2(t2;t1) ￿ 1
for all (t1;t2) 2 [0;1]2. We assume that transfers are feasible if they satisfy
T1(t1;t2) +T2(t2;t1) = 0 (2)
for every pair of reported signals (t1;t2): This requires the cartel to balance its budget
ex post.
The main bene¯t of pooling information is that it allows the cartel to make a
more informed bidding decision. De¯ne
v(s1;s2) = max[0;u(s1;s2)¡ R]:
5to be bidder 1's payo® in the event that it is selected to be the cartel's bidder. The
payo® assumes that bidder 1 learns the reported signal of bidder 2 and pays the seller
the reserve price R if and only if its expected value of the object conditional on its
own signal and the reported signal of bidder 2 exceeds R. We refer to this property
as bidding e±ciency.
E±ciency also imposes a second condition, namely, that the bidder with the high-
est signal should be selected as the cartel's bidder. More precisely, for any i = 1;2
and si;sj 2 [0;1];
Pi(si;sj) = 1 if and only if si > sj: (3)
This requirement is the standard ex post allocation e±ciency condition.
Amechanism is e±cient if it satis¯es bothbidding e±ciency andex post allocation
e±ciency. De¯ne b as the solution to the equation u(b;b) = R and de¯ne
µ(s) = inffx : u(s;x) ¸ Rg:
Note that µ(b) = b. E±cient mechanisms imply that Pi(si;sj) = 1 if si > b and
si > sj > µ(si); it is equal to zero otherwise.
For i = 1;2, de¯ne
¼i(si;ti) = Ex[Pi(ti;x)v(si;x) + Ti(ti;x)] (4)
where si;ti 2 [0;1]. Denote¼i(si;si) by ¼i(si). A cartel mechanism fP;Tgis incentive
compatible if for i = 1;2, and for all si;ti 2 [0;1],
¼i(si) ¸ ¼i(si;ti): (5)
A cartel mechanism is called optimal if it is incentive compatible and e±cient.
To characterize the set of optimal mechanisms, we begin with a standard charac-
terization lemma on incentive compatible mechanisms.
Lemma 1: A cartel mechanism fP;Tg is incentive compatible if and only if for





Ex[(@Pi(t;x)=@t)v1(s;x)] ¸ 0; (7)
where v1 is the partial derivative of v with respect to its ¯rst argument.
6Combining the incentive compatibility with the e±ciency requirement yields the
following characterization.
Theorem 1: Any e±cient, incentive compatible mechanism generates the fol-
lowing expected pro¯ts to a bidder with signal s












Note that a bidder whose signal is below b earns a positive expected payment even
though it will never bid in the seller's auction. If it has the highest signal, the lease is
not worth R and if they have the lowest signal, the other cartel member is selected as
the cartel bidder. The expected payment is strictly increasing in s for signals above
b since there is some chance that a bidder with such a signal will be selected and still
¯nd the lease is worth R:
We turn next to the question of implementation. Suppose the cartel uses a ¯rst-
price knockout tournament with information sharing. Each member submits a bid to
the ring center. The member with the highest bid is awarded the right to bid R in
the seller's auction and pays its bid to the "losing" member. This is the mechanism
analyzed by McAfee and McMillan (1992) in the case of independent private values.
In our context, we need to add an extra feature, namely, that the members commit
to revealing their signals to each other so that the high bidder knows whether or not
it should bid in the seller's auction. It can be shown that the bidding equilibrium in




b [u(x;x) ¡ R]F(x)dF(x)
F(s)2
for s > b and BK(s) = 0 for s ￿ b. The expected payo® is given in (8).
Theorem 2: Any e±cient, incentive compatible cartel mechanism can be imple-
mented by a ¯rst-price knockout auction with information sharing.
Theorem 2 extends the result obtained by McAfee and McMillan (1992) for the
case of independent private values model to common value models with independent
signals.
3 Cartel Enforceability
What is the competitive alternative that determines whether ¯rms want to joint the
cartel? One approach to specify an extensive form game in which bidders ¯rst decide
7whether to join the cartel or not and if not, bid competitively in the seller's auction.
The strength of this approach is that it deals explicitly with the "leakage" problem
that arises when bidders draw inferences about each other's signal based upon their
cartel participationdecisions. Whenthereare morethantwobidders, it also allows for
the possibility of cartels containing only some of the bidders. The di±culty is that,
if at least one bidder chooses not to join the cartel, the subsequent bidding game
involves asymmetric distributions, and the equilibrium for such auctions needs to be
computed numerically. As a result, a general characterization of equilibrium payo®s
is not easily obtained. Moreover, the nature of the payo®s will depend critically
on details about how ¯rms make their cartel participation decision. As a practical
matter, the noise in the ¯rms' decisions to bid on tracts and in the cartel formation
process makes it unlikely that ¯rms will draw sharp inferences about each other's
from their cartel participation decisions.
In this paper we ignore the potential \leakage" issue and model the competitive
alternative as a ¯rst-price sealed bid auction played under symmetric information.
It follows from Milgrom and Weber (1982) that the (symmetric) equilibrium bidding
function for a bidder with signal s is given by
B





where a solves the equation
Ex[u(a;x)jx ￿ a] = R; (10)
and where the expectation is taken with respect to x whose cumulative distribution
function is F(x). The assumptions on u imply a unique interior solution to (10).





The monotonicity assumption on u implies that b < a as long as R > 0. Thus, there
is a range of signals where a bidder does not bid in the competitive auction but bids
in the cartel mechanism.







[u(x;x) ¡ R]dF(x) (11)




8for all si 2 [0;1] and i = 1;2. The next theorem provides a necessary and su±-
cient condition under which the e±cient, incentive compatible cartel mechanism is
enforceable.
Theorem 3: Any e±cient, incentive compatible cartel mechanism is enforceable
if and only if ¼C(1) ¸ ¼D(1).
When bidders draw signals between b and a; they do not bid in the competitive
auction. This can give rise to an ine±cient outcome: if both bidders have such
signals, then neither will bid even though the expected value of the tract conditional
on the signals drawn exceeds the reserve price. The cost of this ine±ciency causes
¼D(s) to increase at faster than ¼C(s). Therefore, ifthe two curves intersect, they can
intersect only once, and it su±ces to compare the pro¯ts of the cartel and competitive
mechanisms for the highest type.




[u(1;x) ¡ R]dF(x) +
Z a
b
[u(x;x) ¡ R]dF(x): (12)
Suppose R ￿ u(1;0) so that µ(1) = 0. Then condition (12) can be rewritten as
Z 1
b




When the reserve price is zero, a = b. This condition also holds when valuations are
private. This leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 1: Suppose either R = 0, or u(s1;s2) = U(s1) and U(1) ¸ R. Then
any e±cient, incentive compatible cartel mechanism is enforceable.
Toillustrate how and why condition(13) may be violated, we provide the following
class of examples:
u(s1;s2) = s1 +s2; R ￿ 1; and F(s) = s¯; where ¯ > 0:
Distributions with higher values of ¯ haveless mass on low signals. The unconditional









Note that the di®erence a¡b decreases with ¯. The probability of observing at least
one bid in the seller's auction is 1 ¡ F(a)2, which is increasing in ¯. The average
value of the leases that receive at least one bid is given by





9It can be veri¯ed that E(V js1 > a;or s2 > a)=E(V) decreases with ¯.
Simple calculation shows that there is a monotonically increasing function R =
g(¯) withg(0) = 0 such that inequality (13) is satis¯ed if and only if R ￿ g(¯). Thus,
given any positive reserve price R, if the distribution is su±ciently skewed toward low
types (i.e., low value of ¯), the cartel is not enforceable since some high types will
prefer the competitive mechanism. Interestingly, in this example, the signal at which
the bidder is indi®erent is always below R.
In the caseof R = 1and¯ = 1=2, we provide the followingdetails. The conditional
expected value is given by
Ex[u(a;x)jx ￿ a] =
Z s
0




It follows that the cuto® point above which the bidder submits a positive amount is
a = 3=4:











; s ¸ 3=4;
The equilibrium expected payo® for a bidder with signal s from the noncooperative










; s ¸ 3=4:
In the case of the ¯rst-price knockout auction with information sharing, note that
u(b;b) = R implies that b = 1=2, which is the cuto® point above which the bidder




s2¡ s + 1=4
2s
; s ¸ 1=2:













for all s 2 [1=2;1]. It can be veri¯ed that the two curves intersect at s = 0:887.
104 Pure Common Value
In this section, we study the polar case of a pure common-values model with inde-
pendent signals. In this case it does not matter what allocation rule is adopted by
the cartel since all bidders value the lease identically given the same information.
Unfortunately, if Pi(si;sj) is not uniquely determined by the condition of allocation
e±ciency, the set of incentive compatible, e±cient cartel mechanisms is very large and
di±cult to characterize. We will focus primarily on a comparison of two mechanisms:
the ¯rst-price knockout tournament with information sharing and the equal sharing
(or joint bidding) mechanism with information sharing. The objective is to identify
the circumstances under which a cartel may prefer joint bidding to the knockout auc-
tions. Throughout this section, we shall assume that u(s;t) = s+ t; where s denotes
bidder 1's signal and t denotes bidder 2's signal. The substantive restriction here is
additivity, which rules out complementaries between the signals. With arbitrary dis-
tribution functions, signals can always be relabeled to make bidder valuations linear
in the signals.






Max[s + t¡ R;0]dF
where µ(s) = Max[0;R ¡ s], s 2 [0;1]. Both mechanisms are e±cient and incentive
compatible. They also satisfy ex post budget balance. Thus, even though they
distribute the spoils di®erently across types, the ex ante expected payo®s under the
two mechanisms are the same, that is, Es¼E(s) = Es¼C(s): This implies that the two
curves have to intersect at least once.
Theorem 4: Suppose u(s;t) = s + t for all s;t 2 [0;1]: Then ¼C and ¼E
intersect at least once, but at most twice.
We now compare the two payo®s for the highest type. Using simple calculations,










where µ(1) = Max[0;R ¡ 1]. The inequality is satis¯ed for a fairly large class of
distribution functions. For instance, it can be easily veri¯ed that if F(x) = x¯, for
¯ > 0, then the inequality always holds. In general, the inequality holds when the
distribution has more mass at lower types.
Given this class of distributions, Theorem 4 implies that there are only two pos-
sibilities: either the two pro¯t curves intersect once, in which case, the lower types
prefer equal sharing to the knockout auction, or the two curves intersect twice, in
11which case the intermediate types prefer equal sharing to the knockout auction. In
both cases, the high types prefer the knockout tournament since it tends to reward
them relatively more the equal-sharing mechanism.
The main result of the previous section is the high types on marginal tracts will
reject a cartel that uses a knockout tournament. The main result of this section is
that high types prefer the knockout tournament to joint bidding. Combining these
two results, we obtain the prediction that joint bidding is likely to occur in a common
value environments when neither bidder has a very high signal.
5 Empirical Strategy
To be written. Much of the material will be based on a previous draft of this paper
(Hendricks and Porter, 1997).
6 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1: E±ciency implies that Pi(si;sj) = 1 if si > b and si > sj >







for s ¸ b and 0 otherwise. Integrating the above equation yields






for s ¸ b, where ¼0 is a constant. Changing integration order in the above expression
yields









To determine ¼0, note that, from (4),
¼i(s) = Ex[Pi(s;x)v(s;x)] +ExTi(s;x):
12It follows that
ExTi(s;x) = ¼i(s)¡ K(s)
for s ¸ b and is equal to ¼i(s) if s ￿ b. Thus,





















Proof of Theorem 2: We ¯rst derive theequilibrium bidfunction in a¯rst-price
knockout auction with information sharing. Let B(s) be a symmetric equilibrium












= [v(s;s) ¡ 2B(s)]
f(s)
F(s)






for s > b and BK(s) = 0 for s ￿ b. It can be veri¯ed that the second-order condition
for the bidder's optimization problem is satis¯ed. Given the monotonicity of the
bidding function and information sharing among bidders after bidding, the allocation
13outcome from the ¯rst-price knockout auction is the same as that in the e±cient,
incentive compatible cartel mechanism.
Next, we show that the interim transfers are also the same between the two mech-
anisms. It su±ces to show that bidders receive the same pro¯ts. Indeed, the











for s > b and equal to
R 1


















It follows that ¼K(s) = ¼C(s) for all s 2 [0;1].
Proof of Theorem 3: First notice that the pro¯t for a bidder with signal s
from the seller's auction, ¼D(s); is equal to zero for s ￿ a, and strictly increasing in







On the other hand, by Theorem 1, the pro¯t for a bidder with signal s from an
e±cient, incentive cartel mechanism, ¼C(s); is a positive constant when s ￿ b, and














Therefore, ¼C(s) ¸ ¼D(s);8s 2 [0;1] ifand only if ¼C(1) ¸ ¼D(1). The claim follows.
14Proof of Theorem 4: It su±ces to show that the curves intersect at most twice.









for s 2 [0;R=2] and
¢






for s 2 [R=2;1]: Thus, ¢(s) is strictly decreasing in [0;R=2], so it intersects the
horizontal axis at most once. Moreover, ¢(s) is strictly convex in [R=2;1] so it
intersects the horizontal axis at most twice. If ¢(s) intersects the horizontal axis in









that ¢(s) cannot intersect the horizontal axis more than once. The case of R > 1 is
similar. The claim follows.
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